Abstract. Commercial banks might profit from the adoption of methods widely used in network theory. A decision making process might become biased if one disregards network effects within the corporate client portfolio. This paper models the phenomenon of customer attrition by generating a weighted and directed network of corporate clients linked by financial transactions. During the numerical study of the agent-based toy model we demonstrate that multiple steady states may exist. The statistical properties of the distinct steady states show similarities. We show that most companies of the same community choose the same bank in the steady state. In contrast to the case for the steady state of the Barabási-Albert network, market shares in this model equalize by network size. When modeling customer attrition in the network of 3 × 10 5 corporate clients, none of the companies followed the behavior of the initial switcher in three quarters of the simulations. The number of switchers exceeded 20 in 1% of the cases. In the worst-case scenario a total of 688 companies chose a competitor bank. Significant network effects have been discovered; high correlation prevailed between the degree of the initial switcher and the severity of the avalanche effect. This suggests that the position of the corporate client in the network might be much more important than the underlying properties (industry, size, profitability, etc) of the company.
Introduction
Network theory is widely used in many sciences, and it has a long tradition in social sciences, as well. With regard to commercial banks, the position of banks in the network of directorate interlocks of the largest Hungarian enterprises has been analyzed by means of network theory by [20] . Other groups of studies assess the actual topologies observed in the financial system. Reference [5] provides an empirical analysis of the network structure of the Austrian interbank market. Reference [13] analyzes the network topology of the Italian segment of the European overnight money market. Reference [16] describes the network topology of the interbank payments transferred over the Fedwire, both under normal circumstances and in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Our paper can also be linked to the literature of buyer-seller networks. An interesting contribution in this field is e.g. the recently published paper of [4] that presents a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier-customer relationships involving extension of trade credit.
The application of network theory might create value in the banking industry. Among other things, the potential usefulness of network theory may be demonstrated in the fields of customer attrition, customer retention, customer acquisition, diffusion of various banking products, and the assessment of portfolio stability.
The paper focuses exclusively on the phenomenon of customer attrition at commercial banks. In Hungary anecdotal evidence shows that 3-4% of the customers switch their banks each year, and another 10-15% can be convinced-by efficient marketing and sales strategy-to choose another bank. Nowadays bankers address the question of customer attrition within the framework of customer relationship management by classifying the clients and predicting their expected behavior. In principle, by applying methods from data mining, bankers disregard network effects within their corporate client portfolio. The value of customers is determined on a one by one basis and the potential spill-over effects resulting from financial linkages among customers are not considered. Nevertheless, if one large corporation switches its main bank, hundreds of its strongly linked counterparties may do the same. The switching avalanche might result in a far higher loss than initially predicted.
Customer attrition has a significant impact on profitability of the banks, as the attrition-retention ratio has a direct impact on expense ratios. Replacing customers increases the relative cost per new customer and redirects critical resources away from important growth initiatives. In contrast, a 5% increase in customer retention may increase profits from 25 to 85% [2] . The key factors of retaining customers are customer satisfaction and customer loyalty. A total of 70-75% of customers expressing satisfaction with the financial organization also say they will definitely not switch, and will recommend the business to someone else and will consider buying other products from the financial institution. Meanwhile, almost 60% of dissatisfied customers say they plan to switch banks.
In this paper the phenomenon of customer attrition is modeled by means of network theory. Real data on the banks' corporate client portfolio is strictly confidential. In the absence of citable data sets, the directed and weighted network of corporate clients linked by financial transactions has been generated on the basis of stylized facts. In the model the dynamics results from the decision making of companies in choosing a bank. Both the network generation and the decision making process of companies are supported with some realistic assumption and data. Despite the effort of filling up the model with realistic features, we end up with an agent-based model drawing on a game theoretical background. During the numerical study of the toy model we examine whether there exists a steady state on the basis of the rational decision of companies regarding their choice of bank. Additionally, we address the question of what would happen if one of the companies switches bank. Will the counterparties also cancel services and follow the behavior of the company? How serious is the avalanche effect? By which type of distribution can the number of companies switching bank be characterized? Special attention is devoted to analyzing the avalanche effects in the worst-case scenario. The role of the underlying network structure and the algorithm for assigning weights to the links are also investigated with the Erdős-Rényi and the Barabási-Albert networks as benchmarks. Finally, the relationship between the degree of the initial switcher and the severity of the avalanche effect is analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of the corporate client network. After motivating (section 2.1), the network generation algorithm and the basic properties of the generated network are described (section 2.2). In section 2.3 the directions and the weights of the links are assigned. In section 2.4 the principles on the basis of which a company selects its main bank are highlighted. Section 3 summarizes the main results. Section 3.1 discovers the properties of the equilibrium, section 3.2 assesses the disturbance caused by the initial switch to the rest of the system, while section 3.3 highlights the impact of the algorithm for assigning weights to the links on the severity of customer attrition. Section 4 provides a conclusion.
The model

Motivation for the model
To the best of our knowledge, the degree distribution of the network of companies linked by financial transactions is scale-free. There exist several companies with outstandingly high numbers of counterparties, while most others have low connectivity. The scale-free properties of interlinked companies were demonstrated for example in the case of the Indian car component industry by [15] . References [5, 16] and [12] also found that the degree distribution of the networks, either formed by interbank lending or by interbank payments, follows a power law in the case of Austrian banks, US commercial banks and Japanese banks, respectively. Note that the banks themselves may be considered as companies belonging to the financial sector.
Additional properties of the network of companies linked by financial transactions include the following: (1) the network exhibits high average clustering, contains (2) community structures, and can be characterized with (3) a small world property. Properties (1) and (2) may be explained by the fact that most economic sectors show dense intrasectoral and relatively sparse intersectoral connections. The assumption that the network of corporate clients exhibits a small world phenomenon is based on the examples of the Austrian interbank network and the Fedwire interbank payment network [5, 16] .
The network of companies is modeled on the basis of [10] and [18] . In addition to growth and preferential attachment, the network generation model of [10] also incorporates an additional feature of real-world networks. The author constructed an agent-based model in which agents represent the nodes of the network that connect to one another aiming to maximize their connectivity. Each agent may build a fixed number of links. However, information about the existing network is costly, so agents must optimize their utility under budget constraints, that is, only having information about a limited number of existing nodes. The number of potential neighbors correlates with the personal budget constraints of the newcomer, and correlates with the price of the information. We argue that this kind of model setup is a realistic one as companies also have to operate with limited information. Normally, companies only possess information about their direct trading partners, competitors and companies located nearby. Companies have to devote additional resources to acquire information about other companies. However, resources (e.g. human capital) are limited and costly. Thus, companies must maximize their utility (profit) subject to the available set of information. Additional models addressing the problem of network generation subject to certain constraints include e.g. [1, 9, 19] .
In [10] the potential neighbors of a newcomer are assigned by the Central Authority on the basis of a random selection process. The Central Authority is the one that has global access to information on the distribution of links and the size of the entire preexisting population. The idea of a Central Authority has been eliminated from our model. Instead, similarly to [18] , we propose a model for a growing network, in which all edges are generated in connection with new vertices joining the network with some kind of local nature. In the model of [18] network growth is governed by two processes: (1) attachment to random vertices, and (2) attachment to the neighborhood of the random vertices, giving rise to implicit preferential attachments. The authors argue that the model captures the salient features of real-world social networks. The most important topological features of the generated network include (1) a scale-free degree distribution, (2) a high degree of clustering, (3) communities with dense internal connections, (4) a small world property, and (5) positive degree-degree correlation, implying that the network is assortative. As argued previously, the network of corporate clients may also be characterized by (1)- (4) .
In order to build a realistic model, the network of corporate clients should be directed and weighted. The direction of the links is determined on the basis of the direction of net money flow, while the weights of the links correspond to the value of funds transferred.
The direction of the links should incorporate the facts that (1) a company might act as a buyer in one relation, and as a seller in another, (2) companies on the periphery, that is, companies with a few links, tend to be sellers and (3) companies with high degrees tend to be buyers. Note that (3) can be explained by the behavior of the largest Hungarian companies, e.g. GM or Audi Hungary. These companies operate with thousands of suppliers, while their exclusive buyers are their head institutions abroad. Supermarket chains, like Auchan, Spar and Tesco, also buy their products from hundreds of companies, but sell them to the retail sector excluded from the model.
We have relied on real data by assigning the exact weights to the links. Several empirical studies have found that-except for the upper tail-the log-normal distribution fits the distribution of firm sizes reasonably well. The fact that the number of firms is normally distributed as a function of the logarithm of the sales revenues was shown by [11] more than 50 years before, and later on e.g. by [6] and [17] . The log-normal distribution of the firm size was also verified empirically by using sales data for 287 821 Hungarian companies. On the basis of the log-normal distribution of sales, we assumed that the value of transactions is also log-normally distributed. This is a reasonable assumption as most companies receive their sales revenue through bank transfers.
Network generation
In our model we operate with a limited amount of information and utility maximization subject to the available set of information. On the basis of [10] , homogeneous budget constraints and constant prices were adopted. The choice of the budget constraint is based on the fact that the heterogeneous and homogeneous budgets yield qualitatively similar networks and have no effect on the topology of the generated network. Let n i denote the number of vertices to which a newcomer (vertex i) is linked. For the sake of simplicity, let n i = E for all i, where E is a positive integer and uniformly distributed between 1 and 3. Thus, it is assumed that the new vertex i is linked-with equal probability-to one, two or three vertices. At the very start, a totally linked network of size N = 3 was generated. Additionally, in line with [18] , newcomers were assumed to be attached with some kind of local nature. The network generation algorithm reads as follows. to the formation of communities, as shown in figure 1(a) . Additionally, the degree distribution follows a power law, which is demonstrated in figure 1(b).
Direction and weights of the links
On the basis of the stylized facts mentioned in section 2.1, the direction of the link between vertices i and j was determined by equation (1) . With probability p ij the link is directed from j to i, and with probability (1 − p ij ) the link is directed from i to j, where p ij is defined as
where d i and d j are the degrees of vertices i and j, respectively. Function f is a monotonically decreasing function f (·, ·) :
The second argument of f ensures the monotonically decreasing property of f (·, y). The monotonically decreasing function applied in the model can be written as
The concrete form of function f does not influence our results. Thus, in the absence of real data, we looked for the simplest form that supports our a priori knowledge on the direction of the links. By assigning the directions of the links in the above described way, we could ensure that vertices on the periphery tend to be sellers (p ij ≈ 1). Moreover, if a link connected two companies with many trading partners, then the direction of the link was randomly chosen (p ij ≈ 0.5). This was also the case if a link connected two companies with a few counterparties of more or less equal numbers. In function f the component (x − 1)
2 ensures that at the edges the derivatives are 0. The components 0.1 control for reaching p = 0.5 in the desired way.
As we argued in section 2.1, the weights of the links follow a log-normal distribution. In our model a log-normal distribution with parameters μ = 0 and σ = 1 was assumed. Furthermore, we assumed that the larger the companies trading with one another, the higher the value of funds transferred. In line with this, the algorithm for assigning weights to the links performs the following. 
Dynamics: the decision making process of joining a bank
Corporate clients choose their main bank on a fully rational basis in the model. Due to lower transaction costs and quicker fund transfer, corporate clients prefer intrabank transfers to interbank transfers. In line with this, companies choose from among the competing banks the one to whom the majority of their outgoing payments are directed. Initially, each company chooses a bank with uniform randomness and then, this choice is reviewed. Let w i,j denote the weight of the link directed from node i to node j. Indicate with Greek symbols the banks; B corresponds to the set of banks. The algorithm describing the decision making process of companies regarding their choice of bank includes the following steps:
(i) Index the links directed from node i to companies belonging to bank α:
Take the set of indices obtained this way.
(ii) Calculate company i's proportion of transactions directed to companies belonging to bank α:
(iv) Company i chooses α max with probability w i,αmax , and chooses its original bank with probability (1 − w i,αmax ).
Let us demonstrate the decision making process of companies by giving an example. Assume that 55% of the outgoing payments of company i are directed to companies belonging to bank α (w α = 0.55). The rest of the outgoing payments are directed to two other banks: w β = 0.30 and w γ = 0.15. Thus, w α is maximal. If company i's original bank was β, then the company chooses bank α with p α = 0.55 and bank β with p β = 0.45. This kind of model setup reflects the companies' rigidity to switching bank. As switching bank is costly, if there are no significant benefits (cost savings), companies hesitate to do so. Note that if company i's original bank was α, then the company chooses bank α with p α = 1.
Before presenting our simulation results it is important to emphasize that despite the effort of supporting our model with realistic assumptions and data, there are many missing data. Thus, the model might be considered as a toy model in which corporate clients act as rational agents.
Results
Steady state
Firstly, we address the question of whether a steady state exists on the basis of the rational decision of companies regarding their choice of bank. In addition to the network of corporate clients described previously, we also look for the existence and properties of the steady state in Erdős and Rényi's random graph model and in Barabási and Alberts' scale-free network. For the sake of simplicity, an economy with three homogeneous banks was assumed. The algorithm for reaching the steady state may be described as follows.
(i) Assign each company a bank with uniform randomness.
(ii) Select a node (company) randomly. The company joins a bank according to the decision making process described in section 2.4. (iii) Repeat step (ii) until the steady state is reached, that is, none of the companies wish to switch bank. There is no inherent tendency for change in the system; after several iterations we ended up with a state of stable conditions. We might call this state, as many physicists would do, the equilibrium state or market equilibrium. Nevertheless, following the jargon of the game theoretical literature and the agent-based simulations we refer to this state as the steady state.
Although the update is asynchronous in the model, company i's choice affects the decision of company j, when it is its turn to decide which bank to choose. The higher the proportion of company j's payments directed to company i, the stronger the feedback effect is.
One possible realization of the steady state in the network of corporate clients is demonstrated in figure 2 . The various colors (red, green, black) imply that the companies belong to distinct banks. As demonstrated by figure 2, certain subgraphs of the network are dominated by a single color. Most companies of the same community choose the same bank.
Secondly, we examine the market shares of banks in the steady state. The market share of bank α corresponds to the proportion of transactions (funds received and funds transferred) realized by the corporate clients belonging to bank α with respect to the transactions executed by all the companies. The market share of bank α (ms α ) can be written formally as If companies i and j do not trade with each other directly, then w i,j = 0 and w j,i = 0 in the denominator. Thus, the summing along j is only carried out for the direct neighbors of company i. It is important to note that the market share in the steady state is not determined by the underlying properties of the companies (industry, size, profitability, etc). In contrast, it is determined by the position of corporate clients in the network. Figure 3 shows the market shares and their standard deviations in the steady state. As demonstrated by figure 3, in the network of corporate clients generated by the algorithm described previously and in the Erdős-Rényi network, market shares equalize by network size. In the egalitarian network of Erdős and Rényi, none of the banks is able to acquire a significantly higher market share than the others. This can be explained by the lack of nodes with very large number of relations. In contrast, in the Barabási-Albert scale-free network one bank dominates the entire financial industry apart from a few, non-accessible companies located at the periphery of the network. In the Barabási-Albert network one bank can gain control over the entire economy through companies with high degrees. However, in our scale-free network each bank disposes of a stable corporate client base. The formation of a stable corporate client base may be explained by the existence of communities that are strongly linked, but do not belong to the same banks.
One of the counterintuitive features of the model lies in the large number of steady states with similar statistical properties. In each run, companies were assigned to a bank with uniform randomness; thus the starting points were different. As a straightforward consequence there were large variations in the path for reaching the steady state and in the possible realizations of the steady states. Nevertheless, the statistical properties of the distinct steady states were similar. From this point of view the behavior of the model shows similarities to spin glasses, except that there are no antiferromagnetic interactions. Means and standard deviations were averaged over 100 runs (random allocation of banks) for 10 distinct networks generated by the corresponding algorithms. In the model there are three banks, and the other model parameters are N = 10 000, 50 000, 200 000 and 300 000.
Customer attrition
Customer attrition has a significant impact on banks' profitability. According to banking experts, from time to time, an apparently insignificant company leaves its bank, after which 200-250 other corporate clients of the same bank do the same.
This section models the phenomenon of customer attrition. We assume that the financial sector has already reached the steady state, and one randomly selected company switches bank. We examine the disturbance caused by the initial switch to the rest of the system by looking at the severity of the avalanche effect. Disturbance in the system is
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The network of corporate clients: customer attrition at commercial banks measured by the number of counterparties that also cancel services and follow the behavior of the switcher. The algorithm for modeling customer attrition reads as follows. Note that the model of customer attrition shows similarities to the [3] sandpile model, which was the first example discovered of a dynamical system displaying selforganized criticality. There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature looking at different types of cascade processes and cascading failures in alternative network topologies (e.g. [7, 8, 14, 21] ). The cascade model presented in the paper differs from the previous cascade models in two respects. Firstly, the principles for the cascading process are based on economic considerations instead of physical ones. Secondly, the cascade manifests as a rewiring of the original topology, instead of node or link removal.
A first-round effect may be observed in the model if at least one in-neighbor switched bank as a consequence of the initial switch. A second-round effect is recorded if the in-neighbors of the initial switcher's in-neighbors also switch bank. Third-round, fourthround, etc effects are also possible.
By modeling customer attrition, we have determined the probability distribution (N a ) of the number of direct and indirect counterparties that also cancel services and follow the behavior of the switcher. The probability distribution of the number of counterparties leaving their original banks is shown in figure 4 . After company i switched bank randomly, first-round, second-round, etc effects were summed up. When none of the companies switch bank, the initial steady state was set back. As a next step, company i = i + 1 switched bank and the number of consecutive switchers was counted. In one run each company acted once as an initial switcher.
In our model no other company abolished its original banking contact (N a = 1) in three quarters of the cases. The corresponding figure is 54% in the Erdős-Rényi model and 78% in the Barabási-Albert model. In our model and in the Barabási-Albert model, the number of switchers exceeded 20 in 1% of the cases. In the Erdős-Rényi network the corresponding figure is higher; in 1% of the cases the number of switchers exceeded 40. The shapes of the distributions are slightly diverse in the three models. The convexity of the distribution curve is the lowest in the Barabási-Albert model, while it is the highest in the Erdős-Rényi model. The decay of the distribution in the Erdős-Rényi network is steeper than it is in either the Barabási-Albert model or ours, if hundreds of switchers are involved. In the Barabási-Albert model, a total of 547 companies opted for another bank in the worst-case scenario. In our model the decay of the distribution representing the number of companies leaving their original banks is nearly the same as it is in the Barabási-Albert model. In the worst-case scenario a total of 688 companies chose one of the competitor banks. The profit lost by the bank of the initial switcher was significant in the worst-case scenario. Its market share has decreased by 1.23%. On the other hand, as it is a zero-sum game, competitor banks have managed to increase their market shares. Note that if instead of three homogeneous banks the banking system was composed of one dominant and a few smaller banks, then the 1.23% shift in the market shares could indicate an unabsorbable shock for one of the smaller banks.
As indicated in figure 5 , the distribution of the avalanche length decays exponentially. In the worst-case scenario the length of the avalanche was 25 rounds in our model. In the Barabási-Albert network the corresponding figure was 24. In contrast to this, the avalanche lasted far longer in the Erdős-Rényi network; the number of consecutive rounds in which at least one company switched bank was 69.
It is important to discover the network properties of those systemically important companies that can generate a significant avalanche effect. Banks should devote special attention to these corporate clients in order to avoid mass attrition. Simulation results show that the correlations between the degree of the companies that initially switched bank and the number of companies leaving their banks afterward are high. The Spearman rank correlation equals 0.19 and it is statistically significant. Thus, the system is mainly driven by network structure. Nevertheless, as shown in figure 6 , there are several companies that could, despite their low degrees, generate a significant avalanche effect. The phenomenon cannot be explained by the clustering coefficient or the betweenness of the nodes. There are no correlation between these topological properties and the number of companies leaving their original bank. Clearly, more investigation is needed to discover the underlying complex pattern.
Role of the weights
In this section the impact of the algorithm for assigning weights to the links on the severity of customer attrition is assessed. By changing ceteris paribus one parameter of the weighting the evolution of customer attrition, namely the distribution of N a , is mapped. The algorithm for assigning weights to the links was modified in two ways.
(i) The weights were drawn from a uniform U[0, 1] distribution. The correlation between the ranking of the weights and the ranking of the links (based on the sum of the degrees of companies linked to one other) remained unchanged (ρ = 0.75). (ii) The weights of the links followed a log-normal distribution, just like initially, but the correlation was ruled out (ρ = 0).
As demonstrated by figure 7, the distinct weighting methods modified the shape of the distribution of switching companies in each case. In the Barabási-Albert network and in the network of corporate clients the initial algorithm for assigning weights to the links resulted in a scale-free distribution. In these models the two modified weighting algorithms lead again to a scale-free distribution, but with a steeper decay. In contrast, in the Erdős-Rényi network all the weighting algorithms resulted in an exponentially decaying P (N a ) curve.
To sum up, if the weights of the links follow a log-normal distribution the cascading effect is more severe in each network compared to a situation in which the weights are drawn from a uniform distribution. Nevertheless, modifying the correlation between the ranking of the weights and the ranking of the links, the tendency is not straightforward. In the Barabási-Albert network the lower correlation (ρ = 0) coupled with a higher probability of significant avalanches. In contrast, in the other two networks the lower correlation mitigated the severity of the cascading effects.
Conclusion
The paper models the phenomenon of customer attrition. We have generated a weighted and directed network of corporate clients. Like in a real-world network of companies, the most important topological features of the generated network include (1) scale-free degree distribution, (2) a high degree of clustering, (3) community structures and (4) a small world property. The dynamics on the network resulted from the decision making process of the companies, regarding their choice of bank.
During the numerical study of the agent-based toy model we have demonstrated that several steady states may exist. Surprisingly, the statistical properties of the distinct steady states showed similarities. These findings are in line with those for several toy models developed by economists and with the behavior of many complex systems analyzed by physicists.
In the paper it was shown that in our model, market shares equalize by network size in contrast to the steady state of the Barabási-Albert network. We have also seen that in the steady state most companies of the same community choose the same bank.
With regard to customer attrition, we have demonstrated that the value of customers should not be determined on a one by one basis, because the potential spill-over effects, resulting from financial linkages among customers, should also be considered. If bankers disregard network effects within their corporate client portfolio, then they will make biased business decisions. In most simulations, none of the companies has followed the behavior of the initial switcher. As a consequence of the initial switch, however, a total of 688 companies have chosen a competitor bank in the worst-case scenario. In the most extreme case, the length of the avalanche totalled 25 rounds. The bank of the initial switcher has lost a significant amount in unrealized profits that has cut its market share by 1.23%. Also, major network effects have been discovered in that high correlation prevailed between the degree of the initial switcher and the severity of the avalanche effect. This latter finding is in line with the idea according to which the position of the corporate client in the network might be much more important than the underlying properties (industry, size, profitability, etc) of the company.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the general applicability of the results to other industries with similar characteristics.
Further application areas might include communication networks, like mobile communication networks, instant messaging networks or social networking sites, where users prefer the platform to which their neighbors in their social network are connected. The results of the paper might also provide guidance in understanding other payment related networks, e.g. usage of competing payment cards where customers and merchants choose the card that is accepted by counterparts in their network.
